At the age of ten he joined Ganden Sumtsen Ling (dga' ldan sum rtsen gling), popularly known as Gyeltang Monastery (rgyal thang dgon), and received the monastic name Lobzang Nyima (blo bzang nyi ma). Upon completing his seven-year mandatory training at the monastery's Tsenzang Khamtsen (bstan bzang khams tshan),[2] he traveled to central Tibet and joined Pombora Khamtsen (spom 'bo ra khams tshan) of Sera Me Monastery (se ra smad). It was customary for novice monks to pursue higher education at one of the central monasteries (gdan sa) for the remaining years of life or for a limited number of years. Lobzang remained at Sera for a few years and returned to Gyeltang.
In the mid-1920s, a native of the Tibetan region Chatreng (cha phreng) named Begar Tongling (bed dgar thong ling), secured armed support from Sichuan provincial government to plunder and loot the communities in the Tibetan frontiers, including Gyeltang, which lies on the west bank of the Drichu River and was therefore outside of nominal Chinese control.[3] Gyeltang itself was ruled by a Religious Council (mchod yon lhan khang) under the auspices of the Tibean government in Lhasa.
On 15 June 1927, the fifteenth day of the year's holiest month (sa ga zla ba, vaiśākha), the Religious Council, which included the Tibetan representative—Gyeltang Monastery had been established by the Fifth Dalai Lama Ngawang Lobzang Gyatso (tA la'i bla ma ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho, 1617–1682) as part of an effort to extend Lhasa's influence in the area—appointed Lobzang Nyima as one of four monks to lead a monastic army unit (ser dmag) and to legislate rules for drafting of monks into the armed forces during emergencies.[4] The Council also consulted the Dorje Shugden (rdo rje shugs ldan) oracle, who allegedly gifted Lobzang Nyima a helmet-banner and an amulet and chose him the chief commander.[5] Although initially reluctant, a senior relative from the prominent local Burom Beldrub ('bu rom bal sgrub) family promised support and persuaded him to assume the leadership. He would hereafter lose his monastic vows and lived as a lay practitioner at the monastery. The nickname "Aku Lemar" or "Uncle Baldy" that mischievous monks gave him might imply his semi-monastic status.
In 1931, he undertook a pilgrimage to central Tibet. There, he had an audience with the Second Pabongkha, Dechen Nyingpo (pha bong kha 02 bde chen snying po, 1878–1941), to whom he confessed the transgressions of his monastic vows, namely his decision to take lives of other sentient beings for the sake of the monastery and the region. Phabongka gifted him a napkin as an amulet. The Sixth Panglung Kuten (spang lung sku rten 06, circa. 1900–1959), a medium for the Setrab (bse khrab), Shugden, and Khache Marpo (kha che dmar po) oracles, assured him protection as well.[6]
The night Wangchuk Tengpa arrived in Gyeltang, a band of Tibetan marauders had surrounded Gyeltang town and were set to attack. He re-strategized the town's defenses and expelled the band, inflicting heavy casualties. A group of young local Tibetans, including his cousin Jangtruk, had meanwhile formed a gang and were looting local households. Wangchuk Tenpa and his force killed the leaders, including his cousin, and disbanded the gang.[7]
Around this time, a Tibetan named Drakkar Nyerpa (brag dkar gnyer pa) allied with a Communist-leaning Chinese warlord Zhang Qifa (丈启发 Tib: krang ci pa) and together they propagated Communism in Gyeltang through coercive means. Wangchuk Tengpa and his forces killed Drakkar Nyerpa, apparently with the approval of the Religious Council. In 1932, in response to the killing, around 300 people rode into Gyeltang to avenge the killing of Drakkar. They burned down Wangchuk Tengpa's residence and began firing from all sides. He escaped the attack, regrouped his members, and drove the assailants out of Gyeltang, acts for which his fame in Gyeltang grew.[8]
In 1934 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sent four surveyors to survey land in Gyeltang. Rejecting Communist claims of authority, Wangchuk Tengpa confiscated their equipment and escorted them out of Gyeltang. He enforced restrictions on using new Chinese currencies in Gyeltang and permitted, through to 1959, only Tibetan currencies and old Chinese silver and brass coins. He also emphasized Tibetan ethnic identity and was opposed to Chinese migration and teaching Chinese language and culture at schools. When a few Chinese residents set up a small school, he restricted Tibetans from enrolling there.[9]
In 1935, He Long (賀龍, 1896–1969), a former Nationalist commander and now a marshal of the Second Army of CCP's Red Army, led a force of 20,000 soldiers in the Long March, passing through Tibetan regions. When the force reached the Gyeltang border, Wangchuk Tengpa, who had received a letter from Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石, 1887-1975) describing the Communists as "the enemy that must be forcefully resisted," led an ambush at Yangtang (yang thang) and Shingkhorak (shing kho rag, also shing khong ra). Although they killed hundreds of the Red Army soldiers, the guerilla groups, vastly outnumbered, began to retreat.[10] The Red Army halted in Gyeltang briefly and marched north through Nangzang (snang bzang).
The Nationalists initially suspected the CCP of setting up army bases in the south-eastern Tibetan regions to counter the Nationalist forces but were relieved to learn that they were instead marching northwards. Despite facing armed resistance in all parts of Kham, the Long March were able to maintain control at some strategic areas, including ferry points on the Drichu (Yangzi) River.[11] In 1936, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged Wangchuk Tengpa's role in the resistance and sent him a letter, gifts, and the title of Zhihui Guan (指揮官, kring hog gan) over the regions of Gyeltang, Nyinak (nyi nag), and Jol Dechen ('jol bde chen).[12] Chinese imperial titles had long been coveted by local leaders, even as they acknoweledged that they came with little or no Chinese practical support, and the letter had no effect and the other regions, which did not consider him as possessing authority.[13]
Chiang Kai-shek cautioned Wangchuk Tengpa that any failure to block the Red Army from marching into Tibet would result in religious persecution, confiscation of properties, and loss of lives, and he therefore urged the people of Gyeltang, Jol, and Kongtsera (kong rtse ra) to seek help from the Lhasa Government. (Kongtsera is also known as Pomtsera, spom rtse ra.) He offered to drop clothes, food, and weapons and suggested that Tibetans guard the vast plains and light fire to signal the airdrops.[14] What transpired in the plan's execution remains unknown. As the Red Army was by then embroiled with simultaneously fighting the Japanese invasion and the Nationalist forces, the Communist intrusions were less frequent in the 1930s and 1940s.
In August 1949 two PLA officers, Senior Officer Liu (Liu Sizhang 柳司长) and Officer Zhang (Zhang Yizhang章议) led a platoon of about fifty troops to Gyeltang Monastery and demanded that the community accept the Communist regime.[15] After the soldiers had left, Wangchuk Tengpa dispatched Osho Tsoyang Nyerpa (o shod tsho dbyangs gnyer pa) and a group of Tibetan soldiers who intercepted the PLA troops at Langnak (glang nag), confiscated their weapons, and escorted them out of Gyeltang. After the Chinese army base sent a letter warning of reprisals, Wangchuk Tengpa allied with Tibetan armed leaders from the neighboring regions. Leaders included Yugang Pon Agyel (g.yu sgang dpon a rgyal) and Khamgang Pon Wangden (khams sgang dpon dbang ldan), and Lampa Gesar (lam pa dge gsar, Pron. Yampa Gesar, d. 1958), who led the monastic and parishioner force of Ngopu Yangchen Puntsok Ling Monastery (sngo phu yang can phun tshogs gling). Zhelngo Pelden (zhal ngo dpal ldan) and Yaktang Sha (g.yag thang sha) led the Kongtsera force, which included the monastic guerilla groups from the parishioners of Ganden Dondrub Ling Monastery (dga' ldan don grub gling).[16] Jungdar Damcho ('byung dar dam chos) led a force from Chatreng.[17] The allied force launched twelve preemptive attacks on Chinese stations in Nyinak Rong, Kodu in Jang, and Lamchen, allegedly killing thousands and pushing Communist soldiers towards Satam (sa tham), known in Chinese as Lijiang.
In 1950, the Chinese army general Liu Sizhang was stationed at Horming Ne (hor ming gnas) in Satam. Liu sent a Tibetan lama, Sherab Wozer (shes rab 'od zer), to Gyeltang with gifts, including a black stallion and tea, to convince the monastic officials that the newly established People's Republic of China (PRC) respected Buddhism, and that any damage that had been suffered had been isolated acts of undisciplined cadres.[18]
Wangchuk Tengpa, disinclined to believe Liu's gesture of goodwill, dispatched his aide Lobzang Chopel (blo bzang chos 'phel) on a reconnaissance in Satam. As Liu's military base reportedly had 20,000 troops with an inexhaustible cache of weapons, the Tibetans delayed their offensives.[19] Liu's military base, which was a unit of the Communist IV Corps, was part of the PRC's "bandit suppression campaign" against the remnant Nationalist troops and would later be used to incorporate Tibet and neighboring lands of Jang and Bai into the new Communist state. The 1950s also witnessed a change in PLA's military strategy, training, and restructuring under their new five-year development plan to transform the less militaristic cadres of the Long March-era into a more formidable and advanced armed force. Having massive military bases at strategic Tibetan borders would play a significant role in China's expansion into the non-Chinese cultural territories.
Not long after, Liu arrived in Gyeltang, and the leadership of Gyeltang Monastery arranged a secret meeting in Yangtang. Liu, accompanied by a translator, met Wangchuk Tengpa, who brought only an aide. In exchange for pledging loyalty to the PRC, Liu guaranteed Wangchuk Tengpa a civil leadership position and assured him that no harm would befall the Tibetans or their religion and culture. He stated that Mao Zedong had urged cadres to travel to Tibetan areas only to work on regional developments and then return to China after the tasks were accomplished, and that time would prove him right. Wangchuk Tengpa rejected Liu's offer and continued to fight, killing and wounding hundreds of Chinese soldiers and seizing their weapons.[20]
Soon another PLA officer arrived at Gyeltang Monastery with an offer to end the armed conflicts. When given a choice between imminent military assaults and promises of peace, the monastery leadership ceased their support for Wangchuk Tengpa's opposition and compelled him to agree to a peace settlement. After signing an agreement, he withdrew from the armed resistance. His nephew Lobzang Chopel and Ayanggang Ngawang Chopel (a yang sgang ngag dbang chos 'phel, 1920–?) continued to lead the local guerilla force.[21]
On February 14, 1951, a PLA captain Danzhang, under Liu Sizhang's order, dispatched a platoon to arrest the Tibetan leader Alago Potum ('a la go po tum). Wangchuk Tengpa took up arms once again and staged a counter-offensive in Alago's defense, killing every single troop of the platoon. He waged several significant attacks on the PRC bases after that.
The 20,000 soldiers of the Satam-based unit of the Communist IV Corps split into two divisions and prepared to march through Gyeltang. This time, Liu demanded that all guerrilla outfits in Gyeltang be dissolved, promising that members who conceded would not be executed or punished. The overwhelming Chinese force compelled Wangchuk Tengpa and guerilla members such as Alago Potum to end their resistance. Chinese authorities accorded them civil positions in the region. Many guerrilla members, however, refused to cede and continued their offensives from hideouts.
In 1952, the PLA began raiding Buddhist monasteries in Satam in Jang, Dartsedo (dar rtse mdo), and other parts of Kham. Those who refused to comply or fought back risked treason charges, which could result in punishment by death and/or confiscation of property. Needless to say, the ensuing years saw a rise of Tibetan animosity towards the Chinese and mutual distrust within Tibetan communities as neighbors began to accuse each other of supporting the Communists. Despite the threats of reprisal, Wangchuk Tengpa continued his resistance.[22]
On March 14, 1952, when a squadron of 700 Chinese troops entered Yangtang, Wangchuk Tengpa assigned two Tibetan groups to ambush them. More than two dozen Chinese and two Tibetans died before the Chinese retreated. Three days later, a Chinese force of 200 attacked the Tibetan supplies and provisions headquarter at Makra Gang (dmag rwa sgang), a cavalry training base for the Tibetan imperial army. Although Tibetan guerrillas killed at least fifty Chinese soldiers, they were defeated and lost one of their primary supply bases.[23]
On March 20, Wangchuk Tengpa dispatched forty Tibetans to ambush a Chinese company of 100 troops escorting twelve loads of medicine from Satam to a nearby destination. The Tibetans attacked the troops at Tsala Gang (tsha la sgang) in Langdo (glang mdo). Killing more than fifty soldiers, they held the others captive for four days until Chinese 'Officer Ding' (Ding Zhang丁长) had Gyeltang monastic leaders intervene to secure the release of the remaining soldiers and consignments.[24]
Liu Sizhang had by then divided his army of 20,000 in Satang into two divisions and he now led one through Gyeltang. As his division approached Bulong ('bu long), on April 13, 1952, Wangchuk Tengpa dispatched a group of sixty Tibetan guerillas to ambush them. They estimated that they killed around 500 Chinese troops, including two high-level army officers who were next in command to Liu Sizhang. Some Tibetans were wounded, but none perished. Armed groups of Tibetans were engaging PLA forces in areas across the south-eastern border; this was considered one of their greatest successes.[25]
Wangchuk Tengpa also ambushed a large contingent at Jemakha (bye ma kha) in Yangtang, killing around sixty Chinese. Not all his campaigns were successful; he and his forces also suffered setbacks and lost both lives and bases, including Chi Dzong (spyi rdzong), a defunct armory of the Tibetan government. It appears that all his activity was directed on the local and regional level. Wangchuk Tengpa sent a letter through Khampa traders to the traditional Tibetan government in Lhasa detailing the situation on the frontier and requesting military support. However, there is no information on how the Tibetan officials viewed the letter nor of any official reply.[26]
In mid-April, women fled their homes and took shelter in the mountainous nomadic area of Belgo (bal sgo). The PLA detected the hideouts, and, locals maintain, soldiers fired indiscriminately at an eighty-year-old man and thirty-two women, killing everyone save for two people who were wounded and assumed dead. Fifteen other women were said to have escaped. Accounts across the region indicate that the killing of civilian Tibetans was now becoming premeditated.[27]
At the end of April 1952, Wangchuk Tengpa retreated and fled towards Termarong, where he ordered several attacks, all of which failed. A large unit under Wangchuk Tengpa had now taken shelter at a secure cave in the valley, which also served as a major base. PLA shelled the cave from all sides, but the strategic vantage enabled the guerillas to fire and kill several Chinese soldiers. After the PLA army had exhausted all their strategies, including air and ground, they lined up the lamas, geshes, and local leaders of Gyeltang, all facing the cave and surrounded by the PLA firing guards.[28]
Unable to bear the sight, Wangchuk Tengpa urged his fellow guerillas to surrender for the sake of the safety of the people and peace in the region. He finally expressed his decision to surrender to their highest military officer. The PLA soldiers filled the valley with their clapping, celebrating their success in "unifying nationalities into the Middle Kingdom" as much as their victory in this isolated military campaign. Wangchuk Tengpa and his group, led by the PLA army, met General Liu Sizhang halfway at Jang Ritro ('jang ri khrod). Liu is said to have expressed his appreciation for Wangchuk Tengpa's tenacity. In the valley, amidst Chinese soldiers, Wangchuk Tengpa conceded and said, "Neither the Monastery nor the people, but I alone am responsible for leading this resistance. You can now behead me and take my head to Mao Zedong." Liu replied that he was not authorized to do so. Instead, he expressed his intention to take him on tour to China, and he allowed other guerilla members to return to their villages and return to civilian life.[29]
At Gyeltang Monastery, Wangchuk Tengpa again repeated, "I alone am responsible for the thousands of Chinese killed during the resistance. If I die now, I consider it a short life; if I die tomorrow, I deem it a long one." Tibetans felt distraught and helpless. A close aide, Ngawang Chopel, later remarked, "Overwhelmed by both number and weaponry, it was like 'a palm contending to outdo the sky's expanse.' The only recourse was to heave a long sigh of resignation."[30]
In 1953, as soon as all fighting between Pawo's monastic Tibetans and the Chinese ended in Gyeltang, the PRC began enforcing its Democratic Reforms. The non-monastic guerilla members of Gyeltang and the forces of neighboring regions around Mt. Khawa Karpo (kha ba dkar po), such as Jol, Kongra, Chatreng, Nangzang, Tsawa Rong (tsha ba rong), and Tsakalo (tsha kha lho) continued to resist full-scale Democratic Reforms to until as late as 1959.[31] Around this time, PRC engaged Zangbum Ngawang Lobzang Tenzin Gyatso (zangs 'bum ngag dbang blo bzang bstan 'dzin rgya mtsho, 1899–1967), who was a head lama of Gyeltang Monastery and a founding member of the local armed group, in their campaign. PRC appointed Zangbum Rinpoche as the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in 1954,[32] whereafter he called upon the locals of Gyeltang and neighboring regions and monasteries, including Ganden Dondrub Ling Monastery,[33] to cooperate with the PRC. According to his biographer Gyangmar Ngawang Chopel Tenzin (gyang dmar ngag dbang chos ’phel, 1935–2007), Zangbum Rinpoche sincerely hoped to protect Tibetan religion and culture despite his deep reservations against PRC. During their meeting in Beijing in 1954 he successfully invited the Fourteenth Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso (tA la’i bla ma 14 bstan ’dzin rgya mtsho, b. 1935) to visit Gyeltang.[34] Zangbum Rinpoche was appointed Governor of the prefecture in 1957. He died in 1967 under torture sessions the Cultural Revolution, where he was charged for founding a local armed resistance force and advocating religion and culture in violation of the Communist ideology.[35]
The PRC later invited Wangchuk Tengpa on a tour of China to showcase him as a defeated resistance fighter and to indoctrintate him. He was given an audience with Chairman Mao Zedong, during which Mao, on learning that Wangchuk Tengpa was teetotaler, ordered green tea for the traditional toast. Chairman Mao said that he was aware of Wangchuk Tengpa's armed resistance, and he praised his courage as a member of the Tibetan nationality. With Mao wishing him a productive tour, Wangchuk Tengpa embarked on his visit to Chinese offices and military bases, where PLA officers narrated the story of his patriotism and sacrifice for his land and people, now firmly under the control of the PLA.[36]
While Wangchuk Tengpa was touring China, with no information on his itinerary or whereabouts, locals in Gyeltang began to worry about his safety; many claimed to have seen him in their dreams. After several months, Wangchuk Tengpa returned riding a grey horse to the Monastery, where monks wistfully saw him as an incarnation of the mounted deity Setrab, the principal guardian of Gyeltang Sumtsen Ling Monastery.
On his return, PLA officers announced that Wangchuk Tengpa would retain his position as a leader (dbu 'doms) of both Tibetans and Chinese in the region and that the PRC would arrange for his safety and wellbeing. The guerilla members who surrendered were pardoned. His nephew Lobzang Chopel was offered a local administration position; he later died during a Cultural Revolution "struggle session" in 1967.[37]
Having relinquished his armed leadership, Wangchuk Tengpa spent his days in prayers and offering oblation to the guardian deities—Setrab and Dorje Shugden—for the safety and long life of the Dalai Lama and the Tenth Paṇchen Lama, Chokyi Gyaltsen (paN chen 10 blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1938–1989).[38] He died a natural death on October 25, 1964. Chinese authorities extended condolences and allowed locals to observe funerary rituals according to tradition. Post-death offerings were made on his behalf to the Dalai Lama and other high lamas by his fellow guerilla members in exile.
Despite Wangchuk Tengpa's absence from armed leadership, following a mutual settlement with the PRC in 1953, guerilla forces from the three regions, particularly of Jol, Kongra and Gyeltang, collectively known as Jol-kong-gyel-sum ('jol kong rgyal gsum), continued their resistance to as late as 1961. With no centralized Tibetan military to defend the borders, and the Tibetan government in Lhasa in an unmitigated diplomatic dilemma with the PRC, the lives of Tibetans on the frontiers was miserable. Regions like Gyeltang, Jol and Kongra summoned their traders from far away as Lhasa and Kalimpong to fight return and fight the PLA.[39] Between 1959 and 1961, a local survey by members of Jol-kong-gyel-sum in exile maintained that around 2,100 guerrilla members from the three regions reportedly died in the violent armed resistance against the Communists.
While many continued their fight from their guerilla bases, many members from Gyeltang, as well as Jol and Kongtse Ra, headed to central Tibet and joined Chuzhi Gangdruk Resistance Force (chu bzhi sgang drug), where they comprised the THA, CHA, and GA battalions under the leadership of the treasurers (phyag mdzod) of Kharchen Rinpoche (mkhar chen rin po che), the Fifth Samdhong Lobzang Tenzin (zam gdong 05 blo bzang bstan 'dzin), and Ludrub Rinpoche (klu sgrub rin po che), respectively.[40] The treasurers were also among the founding members and advisors when Chuzhi Gangdruk was founded in 1958 under the leadership of Andruk Gompo Tashi (a 'brug mgon po bkra shis, 1905–1964).[41] Many of these guerilla members of the three regions later escaped to India, Nepal, and Burma. Some later joined the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBPF) and the Special Frontier Force (SFF) in India.
Pawo Wangchuk Tengpa's decades-long leadership in the armed resistance against internal and foreign incursions, including against the PRC contrasts with his resigned passivism following his surrender and acceptance of a PRC position. While Tibetans sympathize with the coercive, under-duress, and ransomed nature of his surrender to the PLA, the official Chinese portrait of him applauds his ending of armed leadership as a contribution to the unification of the Middle Kingdom.
With around twenty years of armed leadership waging numerous military onslaughts and resisting foreign intrusions into Tibet in the most volatile of times and space, he remains a hero for the people of Gyeltang and the Tibetan frontiers. Ayanggang Ngawang Chopel, a fellow guerilla member from Gyeltang, hailed him as one of Tibet's greatest guerilla commanders and wondered if any Tibetan "can ever equal Wangchuk Tengpa, let alone excel, in courage and valor."[42]
Author Note: The information on Shugden in this biography was drawn from material published before the current controversy, when Shugden was worshipped by people across Tibet, both government officials and private citizens, clerics and non-clerics. Nothing in the essay is intended to serve as a basis for inferring or implying, either positively or negatively, any current connections between Shugden and the individuals, monasteries, and regions mentioned herein.
[1] Bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 149–150.
[2] Bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 116.
[3] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 6.
[4] Bsod nams rgya mtsho and Shes rab rgya mtsho, 148
[5] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 6–7.[6] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 5.
[7] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 9.
[8] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 9-10.
[9] Mortensen 2020, 280.
[10] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 12–13. See Norbu, 190, and Lai, 82–83.
[11] Jowett, 213–214. Personal communication with Phunang Tengpa and Ngophu.
[12] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 13.
[13] Personal communication with Phunang Tengpa and Ngophu.
[14] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 14.
[15] The lead chief army officer is listed as Linglei San, See Bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 172–173.
[16] Personal communication with Phunang Tengpa and Ngophu.
[17] Bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 175.
[18] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 17.
[19] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 18.
[20] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 18.
[21] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 18.
[22] Bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 173–174.
[23] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 22.
[24] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 22–23.
[25] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 23.
[26] Bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 177–178.
[27] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 23–24.
[28] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 24–25.
[29] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 25–26.
[30] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 27.
[31] See Democratic Reform in Tibet—Sixty Years On, 7.
[32] Mortensen 2020, 285.
[33] Mortensen 2016, 59.
[34] Ngag dbang chos 'phel bstan 'dzin, 118-119.
[35] Ngag dbang chos 'phel bstan 'dzin, 148.
[36] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 28
[37] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 29.
[38] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 30-31.
[39] Personal communication with Phunang Tengpa and Ngophu Agyel.
[40] 'Jigs med dbang rgyal, 4.
[41] G.yung drung rgyal mtshan, 50; personal communication with Phunang Tengpa and Ngophu Agyel.
[42] Blo bzang rgya mtsho and Ngag dbang chos 'pel, 30.
_________________________________________________
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参考书目
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