Khangchen Sonam Gyelpo (khang chen bsod nams rgyal po), better known as Khangchenne (khang chen nas), was born into an aristocratic family of Tsang in the late seventeenth century. The household would go on to be better known by the names Gazhi (dga' bzhi) and Doring (rdo ring); the former name deriving from their estate to the north of Gyantse, the latter from their capital residence on the southeast side of the Barkhor, in the center of Lhasa. While little is known of his early life, he may have been the son-in-law of Lhazang Khan (lha bzang khang,), the Khoshud king of Tibet, which may help to explain the upward trajectory of the family's status during his lifetime. He was first appointed as a revenue collector (bkar yong) to various districts by the Sixth Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso (ta la'i bla ma 06, tshang dbyang rgya mtsho, 1683–1706), until Lhazang selected him to serve as the governor of Ngari (sgar dpon) around 1715. Khangchenne held just such a position during the crucial Zunghar invasion of 1717, and it would be the springboard that would launch him to the pinnacle of Tibetan politics.
Of Mongols and Myth
The Zunghar invasion of 1717 brought to an end the era of Khoshut overlords in central Tibet. Recall that it was Guushi Khan– a Khoshut Mongol– who first bestowed the thirteen myriarchies of Tibet on the 5th Dalai Lama in 1642. Thereafter, his descendants continued to rule there, if only nominally. It was not until the early eighteenth century that Lhazang Khan bucked this trend, staging a coup against long-time regent Sanggye Gyatso (sangs rgyas rgya mtsho, 1653–1705) and assuming a more substantive role in the Ganden Podrang administration. Meanwhile, the Geluk-fundamentalist Zunghars who had once allied with Guushi built a powerful steppe empire in what is now northern Xinjiang, from which they competed with both other Mongols and the Qing. Sensing an opportunity to both strike at their rivals and assume the role of sole benefactor to the Gelukpa, Tsewang Rabtan and his armies launched a surprise assault. While they failed to capture the young 7th Dalai from Qing protection in Amdo, they successfully seized Lhasa and killed Lhazang as he fled from the Potala on December 3, 1717.
While Kangchenne was the first to report to Lhasa from western Tibet the rumors seeping out of Yarkand (yer khin) that a host of 5000 enemy soldiers were on the move, his posting in the far west prevented a direct confrontation. The biography of his nephew Gazhipa Gonpo Ngodrub Rabten (dga' bzhi pa mgon po dngos grub rab brtan, 1721–1792), alias Doring Paṇḍita (rdo ring paN Di ta) simply states that he "stood his ground in Ngari and did not capitulate to the Zunghars." Luciano Petech’s history of the same period provides a much more colorful story that locates its protagonist in Lhasa. Therein, the foreign invaders capture, imprison, and torture Khangchenne for his loyalty to the khan, but when they attempt to ship him off to Zungharia, he escapes and makes his way back to his base in Ngari. Petech himself credits the story to Ippolito Desideri (1684–1733), the prolific Jesuit missionary resident in Lhasa at this time. Desideri, however, attributes these feats not to Khangchenne, but one “Targum Tashi”—likely a fictional character that comingles the personages of both Khangchenne and Polhane Sonam Tobgye (pho lha nas bsod nams stobs rgyas, 1689–1747). Indeed, this particular story better accords with Polhane's experience of the invasion as told in his own biography, composed in 1733 by Dokhar Tsering Wanggyel (mdo mkhar tshe ring dbang rgyal, 1697–1763).
The biography of Doring Paṇḍita demonstrates Khangchenne's mettle in a separate tale. It suggests that, when the Qing troops finally drove the Zunghars out of Lhasa, some Zunghar headmen fled northwest through Ngari with a number of treasures and heirlooms in tow. Once there, Khangchenne tricked them into attending a banquet in a large yurt, which he promptly collapsed, with the unsuspecting headmen still inside. He recovered a large bounty from his ill-fated guests, most notably the sandalwood Ārya Lokeśvara statue that had once been the meditative aid of Songtsen Gampo (srong btsan sgam po). Qing sources make no mention of the statue, though they do suggest Kangchenne killed some hundred Zunghars in Ngari around this time. Regardless, the restoration of this image of Avalokiteśvara to its rightful place on Marpori (dmar po ri) would have been ripe with symbolism. The Ganden Podrang government was founded upon the idea that the Bodhisattva of Compassion would tame the beings of Tibet from his pure-land base of Potalaka. Returning the Avalokiteśvara image to the Potala palace brought Tibet’s savior back to his rightful throne. Thus, Khangchenne became more than the "Militant Hero" evidenced by the Mongol title of Daiching Baatur (da'i ching bA/sba/b+hA dur) bestowed on him around this time by the Seventh Dalai Lama (ta la'I bla ma 07, 1708–1757); he became the restorer of cosmic order.
Political Preeminence
Whatever Kangchen's contributions, it was largely Qing troops who drove the Zunghars from central Tibet, and it was the Kangxi Emperor (1654–1722) who took responsibility for restoring order to the region. It is important to note that the reign of Kangxi (1661-1722)—the longest of any emperor in Chinese history—marked the consolidation of Manchu rule over China, and ushered in a "golden age" (Ch. kang qian shengshi) in which the empire rapidly expanded to triple the size of its predecessor. Having defeated a number of Ming loyalists and rebels in the southern mainland and Taiwan, it was in Kangxi's later years that the dynasty began to pivot westward and take on their enemies in the steppe. This was something of a personal mission for the elderly emperor; he himself led Qing troops in battle against the Zunghars in 1697–98.
Ousting the Mongols from Lhasa in 1720, too, was an extension of this legacy project. In the emperor's eyes, it was the failings of Tibet's prior leadership—Lhazang Khan, the Sixth Dalai Lama, and worst of all, Regent Sanggye Gyatso—that resulted in the collapse of order in the region. While Kangxi did maintain the lineage of a politically weakened Dalai Lama, he resolved to mitigate the risk of a similar calamity by doing away with the offices khan ("king") and desi ("regent") altogether. In their place he instituted a multi-member council of ministers we now know as the Kashak (bka’ shag). At first the cabinet consisted of just three members: Lumpawa Tashi Gyelpo (lum pa ba bkra shis rgyal po, d. 1728), Ngapopa Dorje Gyelpo (nga phod pa rdo rje rgyal po, d. 1728), and Khangchenne. Two years later two more members would be added by the recently enthroned Yongzheng Emperor (1678–1735): Jarawa Lodro Gyelpo (sbyar ra ba blo gros rgyal po, d. 1728) and Kangchen's strongest ally, Polhane.
There was another tweak to the council’s organization in early 1726: Khangchenne and Ngapopa were tasked with leading the council. These two possessed a special distinction from the start, having received the honorific title Beile Prince (Tib. pas se; Man. beise; Ch. beizi 貝子) from the emperor back when they were first appointed to the council. The variegated trilingual patents—in Tibetan, Mongol, and Manchu—composed on April 16, 1721, less than a month after the Kangxi Emperor’s recommendation, remain in the possession of the Tibet Archives in Lhasa to this day. Now, Sonam Gyelpo was explicitly instructed to shoulder the primary role, with Dorje Gyelpo acting as his deputy. The Tibetan and Qing sources disagree about whether the impetus for this arrangement lay in Lhasa or Beijing, but there is some evidence that Kangchen's preeminence predated the emperor's sanction. Italian missionaries resident in Lhasa at this time preserved copies of six edicts (bka’ shog) related to various permissions granted them in 1724–1725. Of these, two were endorsed solely by Khangchenne, whom they refer to as “King Daicing Baatur” in their Italian translations (Rè Telcihnbathur; the Tibetan simply has da'i ching b+hA dur). While the attribution of royalty was no doubt hyperbole, it is also true that no other individual member of the council furnished them with such diplomas. That their letters elsewhere style him "viceroy of" or "for" China (Vice Re per/della Cina) reminds readers of the complex geopolitical context of the time.
The mid 1720s were marked by relative quiet in central Tibet. Aside from the rebellion of the Khoshud chieftain Lubsang Danzin (blo bzang bstan 'dzin) on the fringes of Amdo, over the course of his tenure on the council Khangchenne saw few threats from without. Administratively, it seems that he was more interested in making small alterations to tax and monastic regulations than orchestrating any major policy shifts, and both Tibetan and Chinese records portray him as a capable administrator. He relocated Gyume Dratsang (rgyud smad grwa tshang) to its present location in the northeast of the city, and even attempted, unsuccessfully, to move Namgyel Tantric College (rnam rgyal grwa tshang) out of the Potala.
Some sources intimate that Khangchenne was an overbearing leader, but there are also indications that he could be rather reserved. The inverse of many lay officials of his time, Sonam Gyelpo seems to have preferred his far-flung regional post over the cosmopolitan capital, making the long trek to Lhasa only as necessary. Polhane’s biography suggests that he could be socially conservative. No one dared indulge in drink in front of Khangchenne at the New Year's festivities of 1723, putting a damper on the party for many merrymaking officials. Still, he was open-minded enough to maintain a solid rapport with the Italian Capuchin's resident at the capital during his tenure. It was Khangchenne who granted them permission to construct their hospice (sdod gnas) and chapel (dgon chung) on the outskirts of the city, and even went so far as to request a short biography of Jesus Christ in Tibetan, a project they most likely never completed.
All this changed after Khangchenne formally took over leadership of the council. It was around that time that the Yongzheng Emperor issued an edict to the Kashak instructing them to significantly alter the conditions of Tibet's clerical system. In essence, he called for strict curbs on tantric practices in Nyingma institutions and a prohibition against the initiation of novice monks in all but Geluk monasteries. A steadfast supporter of the emperor, Khangchenne went against the advice of the more ecumenical Polhane and executed the order. There are few accessible extant materials on this imperially mandated policy, regarding either its implementation or reception. What we do know is that it drew the ire of the Nyingma apologists Lelung Zhepai Dorje (sle lung rje drung 05 bzhad pa'i rdo rje, 1697–1740) and Polhane, two of the Tibetan elites most squarely in Khangchenne's corner up to that point. The former had maintained good relations with Khangchenne since the conclusion of the Zunghar occupation, and even identified him as a manifestation of the mundane protector Trakme Nyishar (skrag med nyi shar). The events of 1726 appear to have exhausted Lelung and others' good will.
Downfall
Multiple tensions within the Kashak had simmered since its reconfiguration in the early 1720s. For example, ministers from U and from Kongpo—such as Ngapo Dorje Gyelpo—complained that there was no precedent to appoint officials from the west of Tibet to positions of leadership in the Ganden Podrang administration. Seeing that the council was very sparsely documented prior to this period, it is difficult to say whether or not there was much to their objection. What is clearer is that the reorganization under Kangxi resulted in factional disputes that pitted Khangchenne and Polhane against the rest of the council.
By 1726 cracks in the council had grown into chasms. Precisely what drove the resentment of the ministers of U and Kongpo remains to be seen. Khangchenne's oppressive policy towards non-Geluk institutions may have played some role. Polhane's biography suggests that the others were jealous of Khangchenne’s imperial endorsement and supremacy on the council. Ngapopa himself testified to Qing officials that Khangchenne was selfishly draining the government’s coffers and collaborating with the Zunghars. Some rumors even suggest that Khangchenne had been plotting to kill the other Kashak members. The hostility towards Khangchenne was expressed in both Polhane's dreams, which foretold a grievous occurrence, and a prophecy received by Lelung Zhepai Dorje that warned of the same. Several Qing officials including the Governor-General of Sichuan and Shaanxi reported to the emperor that Khangchenne was forthright, temperate, and respected by the people; still, his haughtiness was a major shortcoming, and his isolation from the rest of the council was apparent. Even Yongzheng himself expressed his concerns in writing. Still, without any viable alternatives, the emperor decided to retain the arrangement of powers as they were.
On August 5, 1727, the anti-Khangchenne faction of the council—Ngapopa, Lumpawa, and Jarrawa (sbyar ra ba)—made their move, murdering Khangchenne in the administrative office above the western entrance to the Lhasa Tsuklakhang (lha sa gtsug lag khang). His two wives and several attendants also suffered the same fate.
The murderers fled Lhasa, but Polhane sent forces and captured and detained them until Qing forces arrived. The imperial officials led by Jalangga then took their testimonies and sentenced them. Ngapopa and Lumpawa were sentenced to death by slow slicing (Ch. lingchi), and their sons were beheaded. Jarrawa was beheaded and his family was sent as slaves to banner garrisons in Jingzhou, Jiangning (Nanjing), and Hangzhou.
Khangchenne Sonam Gyelpo left behind no known heir, although the descendants of his brother Tseten Tashi (tshe brtan bkra shis) continued to hold high offices in the Tibetan administration for another two hundred years. While he is said to have sponsored any number of Geluk institutions in the capital region, he left no signature project. The Nyingma tradition he worked to suppress recovered, but only under the auspices of his protégé, Polhane. His leadership had allowed Tibetans to maintain a degree of autonomy within the Qing empire, but the dissension that arose in his final year encouraged the emperor to tighten the reins; the first imperial residents, or ambans, would arrive in Lhasa just weeks after his death.
དཔྱད་གཞིའི་ཡིག་ཆ་ཁག།
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